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3. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the denial by the District Court of 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 (4) to two prevailing 
plaintiff parties after a jury trial. This appeal challenges the 
denial of attorney's fees based on the District Judge's belief that 
substantial new claims were asserted in the complaint and at trial, 
and after the Court expressed some hope that an appeal be filed to 
get some clarification on these issues; see R Vol. III, p. 487, L. 
l 7, and Tr 502, L. 6-7. 
ii. Course of Proceedings Below 
The plaintiffs and appellants Mathew Bennett and Benjamin 
Wal ton (collectively called plaintiffs herein or by their last 
names Bennett and Walton), both made a written demand for payment 
of their personal injury claims to the defendant and respondent 
Nancy Patrick's insurer Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate 
herein), sixty (60) days before the litigation was filed, under 
Idaho Code § 12-120 (4). A true and correct copy of this demand 
letter is attached as Exhibit 161, and is found at R Vol. II, p. 
258-260. The demand letter included claims for past accrued 
I medical expenses, future estimated medical expenses, lost wages, 
pain and suffering. See also attached Damage Summaries, R Vol. II, 
p. 318-319. A list of medical records attached to the demand 
letter set out on Exhibit Index Lists at R Vol. I, p. 178-182, and 
p. 240-244 as stipulated exhibits later admitted into evidence. 
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The District Court found that the demand letter complied in 
all material respects with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). A copy of the 
plaintiffs' Exhibit List with all medical records in possession of 
the plaintiffs' were attached to the demand letter. The plaintiffs 
waited a period of over 60 days before filing their complaint. See 
R Vol. III, p. 485. 
In response to the plaintiffs' demand letter (R Vol. II, p. 
258-260) on August 20, 2008 Allstate offered Walton $4,600.00; see 
R Vol I I, p. 2 61. There was then other correspondence, and 
Allstate made a "final offer" to settle Walton's case for 
$5,000.00; R Vol. II, p. 262. 
In response to the plaintiffs' demand letter (R Vol. II, p. 
258-260), Allstate's first offer to Bennett was $2,300.00, 
including $710.45 for medical care. See copy of Allstate letter 
dated August 20, 2008 found at R Vol. II, p. 265. Subsequently, 
there was additional correspondence between the parties. Allstate 
later increased their offer to Bennett to $2,500.00 in a letter 
dated September 26, 2008. See copy of the Allstate letter dated 
September 26, 2008 found at R Vol. II, p. 266. 
The plaintiffs then filed the underlying case of Mathew R. 
Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton v. Nancy Patrick; Bannock County 
Case No. CV-08-4528-PI. The plaintiffs' Verified Complaint for 
Personal Injury Damages in Automobile Collision and Demand for Jury 
Trial was filed against Nancy Patrick on November 6, 2008. A copy 
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of the Verified Complaint with exhibits is found in the CLERK'S 
RECORD on appeal at R Vol. I, p. 1-13. 
The Verified Complaint was filed for an amount under 
$25,000.00, and sought attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120 ( 4), as stated specifically in the Prayer at paragraphs A and B, 
last sentence, and paragraph Con attorney's fees; see R Vol. I, p. 
7-8, copy attached for the convenience of the Court. The Prayer of 
the Verified Complaint stated in pertinent part as follows: 
E. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and 
Benjamin L. Walton, pray for judgments against defendant, 
Nancy Patrick, as vehicle owner, responsible party and 
negligent driver as follows: 
A. Special damages for plaintiff Mat Bennett's 
past medical bills of $1,939.71, future medical bills for 
over the counter pain medication, and lost wages of 
$2,600.00; and general damages for pain and suffering in 
an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such other amounts 
as may be proven to a jury at trial, but less than 
$25,000.00 at this time; 
B. Special damages for plaintiff Ben Walton's 
medical bills of $2,992.92, future medical bills £or over 
the counter pain medication, lost wages of $1,200.00, and 
general damages for pain and suffering in an amount in 
excess 0£ $10,000.00, or such other amounts as may be 
proven to a jury at trial, but less than $25,000.00 at 
this time; 
C. For attorney's fees and costs in bringing this 
action, in the amount of $2,000.00 if by default and 
future attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4); and 
D. For such other and further relief as this Court 
deems just and equitable under the premises for 
plaintiff. *** (Emphasis Supplied). 
The defendant Patrick filed her Answer and Demand for Jury 
Trial on December 4, 2008. See R Vol. I, p. 14-20. There was no 
affirmative defense raised that the demand letter or Complaint 
failed to comply with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). There were defenses 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 3 
raised of comparative fault, and that (unbeknownst to the 
plaintiffs) the defendant Nancy Patrick had filed bankruptcy. 
Therefore, in defendant Patrick's bankruptcy case, the parties 
entered into a Stipulation for Stay Relief In Re: Nancy D. Patrick, 
Idaho Chapter 7 No Asset Bankruptcy Case No. 08-40764-JDP; found at 
R Vol. III, p. 459-460. This stipulation expressly agreed that the 
plaintiffs would not pursue any claim in State Court against the 
defendant, personally, for any amount in excess of her Allstate 
! insurance policy, which had policy limits of $25,000.00, per 
person, and $50,000.00 per accident. See R 381-382, 401-461, and 
391 (Allstate Insurance declaration sheet). The Bankruptcy Court 
approved this stipulation in an Order Granting Relief from Stay 
from Bankruptcy Judge Jim D. Pappas at R Vol. III, p. 389-390. 
The plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
April 13, 2009. See R Vol. I, p. 21-24. The motion was supported 
by an affidavit of an eye witness, and the Verified Complaint, that 
the defendant Patrick had pulled onto a busy through street from 
behind a steam roller without looking or yielding, which caused the 
collision. The plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Compel on that 
I same date. See R Vol. I, p. 25-52. 
The defendant then filed a response and memorandum in 
opposition to the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment together 
with the Affidavit of Nancy Patrick on April 27, 2009. See R Vol. 
I, p. 53-61. In her Affidavit, Nancy Patrick testified, under 
oath, that she saw the plaintiff Walton's truck, he was speeding 
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and should have been able to avoid the collision, so Walton was at 
fault and there was comparative negligence by Walton in this case. 
I See R Vol Ip. 60. 
The plaintiffs filed a Response in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on May 6, 2009. See R Vol. I, p. 68-
77. A hearing was held on the motions on May 11, 2009 with 
District Judge David C. Nye presiding. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment was denied without prejudice. See R Vol. I, p. 79-80. 
The parties then completed written discovery and depositions. 
The plaintiffs filed a First Amended and Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment on November 19, 2009, together with the transcripts of the 
depositions. See R Vol. I, p. 81-127. The defendant Patrick 
testified, under oath, in her deposition that she· did not even see 
the plaintiffs' truck before the collision, did not know the speed 
limit on the road, she was unaware of any facts that would show 
negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, and there were no facts 
to support the allegations made in her Affidavit at all. 
The defendant's attorney then filed an Affidavit of Brendon 
Taylor with supplemental discovery on December 21, 2009, on the eve 
of the re-scheduled summary judgment hearing. See R Vol. I, p. 
128 132. In this response the defendant Patrick amended her 
earlier response to the plaintiffs' request for admission in her 
Answer to Request for Admission No. 10, to admit negligence and 
I liability for the accident for the first time. 
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The Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Liability, as stipulated, to by the defendant 
on January 4, 2010. See R Vol. I, p. 136-137. The plaintiffs 
filed a Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in 
Support of Motion for Costs and Fees on the summary judgment motion 
under IRCP 11, 56(g), and 36-37 on the denied requests for 
, admissions on liability. See R Vol. I, p. 138-149. 
! 
The defendant Patrick then filed an objection to the 
plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees on summary 
judgment as to liability on January 15, 2010. See R Vol. I, p. 
150-159. The Court entered a Minute Entry & Order on February 22, 
2010 denying the plaintiffs' motion under Rules 11 and 56, and took 
under advisement the Rule 36 fee issue. See R Vol. I, p. 160-161. 
The Court entered the Decision on Costs and Attorney's Fees on 
March 12, 2010. See R Vol. I, p. 162-169. The Court held that no 
attorney's fees are be proper under the Idaho Court of Appeals 
decision of Payne v. Wallace, 136 Idaho 303, 309, 32 P.3d 695, 701 
( Ct . App . 2001 ) . The denial was without prejudice to a later 
motion for costs and attorney's fees after the trial, which is now 
part of the attorney's fees requested in this appeal. 
An Order of Mediation in good faith was issued by the Court. 
See R Vol. I, p. 170-172. The final Allstate Offer of Judgment 
after mediation for Walton was $6,484.00; R Vol. II, p. 264. 
Allstate then made an Offer of Judgment in the amount of 
$3,424.00 to Bennett dated April 29, 2010 at R Vol. II, p. 266. 
Subsequently, on May 18, 2010, Allstate increased their Offer of 
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Judgment to Bennett to $4,432.00; see Offer of Judgment R Vol. II, 
p. 267. This Offer of Judgment was received by facsimile 
transmission exactly 14 days before the jury trial. 
The defendant Patrick then requested an Independent Medical 
Examination (IME) by Dr. David Simon in Idaho Falls, Idaho. His 
IME reports were favorable to the plaintiffs (discussed more fully 
below), and afterward the defendant Patrick admitted that the 
plaintiffs' past medical expenses were valid and not disputed. 
A Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum was entered on May 14, 
2010. See R Vol. I, p. 172-189. This stipulated into evidence 
most of the plaintiffs' past medical records, and payment of their 
past medical bills and expenses, that were submitted with the 
demand letter, but not the IME reports of Dr. Simon. The defendant 
had admitted liability, and the plaintiffs' past medical expenses, 
so the only issues at trial were the plaintiffs' damages including: 
estimated future medical expenses for care and treatment, lost 
wages for one to two weeks for each plaintiff, and damages for pain 
and suffering. R Vol. I, p. 177 at paragraph K. 
The jury trial took place over two days and is discussed 
below; see also Minute Entry & Order at R Vol. II, p. 194-201, and 
245-248, and Jury Instructions at R Vol. II, p. 194-239. The 
Stipulation and Order for Admission of Exhibits is in the Record at 
R Vol. II, p. 240-244. 
These were the same claims that were always made in this case, 
and did not change during the course of the proceedings. 
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The Judgment on Verdict was entered on June 7, 2010. See R 
Vol. II, p. 203-205. The judgment awarded damages as follows: 
I Bennett $3,978.47; and 
Walton $10,030.92. 
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Additur or new trial or to 
alter and amend the judgment on the verdict in this case to award 
Bennett an additional amount for other medical care and for non-
prescription pain medications in the amount of $1,000.00, double 
the amounts of pain and suffering awarded to each plaintiff, and 
award pre judgment interest on the stipulated past medical expenses 
from the date they were incurred. This was based on the 
defendant's statements that worker's compensation insurance existed 
or was somehow an issue in this case, speculation by the jury as to 
seatbelts, and air bags in the defendant's closing argument, or 
other factors. See Supplemental Record Exhibits A and B. 
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees of 
the Prevailing Party on the Jury Verdict and Judgment on the 
Verdict (found at R Vol. II, p. 249-250), and a Memorandum of Costs 
and Affidavit of Charles Johnson in Support of Motion for Costs and 
Fees on June 18, 2010 (found at R Vol. II, p. 251-301). The 
Memorandum and Affidavit included the demand letter, responses to 
the demand letter, the Offers of Judgment, an Itemized Statement or 
Bill for all time spent by counsel for each plaintiff in the case. 
The Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs also had 
the actual bills and invoices attached at R Vol. II, p. 342-361. 
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The plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum and Brief in Support of 
Attorney's Fees in the Supplemental Record as Exhibit C. 
The defendant filed a motion for costs and memorandum for 
costs on June 21, 2010. See R Vol. II, p. 302-312. The defendant 
filed a motion for reduction of judgment on June 21, 2010. 
Vol. II, p. 313-327. 
See R 
The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the defendant's motion 
for reduction to judgment on July 6, 2010. See R Vol. II, p. 328-
331. The plaintiffs filed an objection to the defendant's motion 
for costs on July 6, 2010. See R Vol. II, p. 332-341. 
The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiffs' post-trial 
motions for additur, interest, costs and attorney's fees on July 7, 
2010. See R Vol. II, p. 362-366. The only objection to the 
attorney's fees was based on the allegation that substantial new 
claims were presented at trial on the plaintiffs' future medical 
care, pain and suffering, primarily because of the testimony of the 
IME Dr. Simon, and closing arguments of counsel for the plaintiffs. 
R Vol. II, p. 365. There was no objection or discussion that the 
language of the prayer of the complaint somehow did not comply with 
the requirements of Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
The defendant filed a supplement to defendant's post-trial 
motions, and responsive pleadings on July 22, 2010; see R Vol. II, 
p. 374-376. The Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief, filed after the 
hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees, is 
found at R Vol. III, p. 449-453. There was no claim or objection 
by the defendant to the plaintiffs' demand letter or that the 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 9 
complaint did not comply with the requirements of Idaho Code§ 12-
120(4). The defendant's sole objection or claim at that time was 
that the plaintiffs presented evidence at trial that included 
significant new items of damages not stated in their demand letter, 
in the IME testimony and closing argument on pain and suffering. 
The defendant also argued that the Court should determine 
prevailing party status under IRCP 54 (d). The defendant also 
argued that Johnson v. Sanchezr 140 Idaho 667, 99 P.3d 620 (Ct. 
App. 2004) had allowed an increase in medical damages to be 
claimed, but stated that this case did not apply in the Court's 
discretion. The defendant also noted that the bankruptcy 
stipulation and order capped the plaintiffs' damages at $25,000.00 
per person; since the defendant probably anticipated that the Court 
may award additional damages, costs, and attorney's fees. 
The Court noted at the hearing held on July 26, 2010 on the 
post-trial motions that there was no dispute as to pre-judgment 
interest on the stipulated past medical expenses. The key issue 
was the costs and attorney's fees. Tr 465. The plaintiffs argued 
that their costs and attorney's fees should be awarded since the 
jury awarded double the amount of their pre-trial offers under 
Idaho Code § 12-120 (4), and more than the augmented offers of 
judgment under IRCP 68. Tr 4 66. The Judge noted that there was 
prior case law that apparently adopted the plaintiffs' position. 
Tr 467. 
The defendant argued that there were new and different claims 
for damages. Tr 468. The defendant did not mention or argue that 
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i 
the complaint was defective or ambiguous on the claim for 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
The Court noted that the Idaho Supreme Court had not adopted 
the defendant's position, and it appeared that the plaintiffs had 
met or beat the defendant's prior offers. Tr 469-470. The Court 
noted that what mattered was that the Offers of Judgment were 
beaten, and not by how much. Tr 471. 
The defendant argued that in the motion for relief from stay 
to allow the personal injury case when Nancy Patrick filed 
bankruptcy, the parties had stipulated that the defendant would not 
be liable for any damages in excess of $25,000.00. The ref ore, 
damages were capped at $25,000.00, not including attorney's fees. 
Tr 463-464. The defendant was never personally at risk for a 
higher verdict in excess of $25,000.00 per person. 
The Court issued the decision on post-judgment motions on 
August 25, 2010; R Vol. III, p. 477-491. The Court recited the 
facts of the case pertinent to the motions with respect to the 
plaintiffs' demand letter under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), and Offers 
of judgment. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for additur 
for additional non-prescription pain medications, and the additur 
for pain and suffering, because the Court stated that insurance and 
the seatbelt defense evidence was cured with jury instructions, and 
the reference to the airbags not deploying was based on photographs 
(even though there was no testimony on that point at all as 
discussed below). 
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The Court granted the plaintiffs request for pre-judgment 
interest on the undisputed past medical expenses under Idaho Code 
§ 28-22-104. Pre-judgment interest was added to the verdicts. R 
Vol. III, p. 479. 
The Court granted the defendant's motion for remittur for 
payment of one of Walton's medical bills by Allstate. This verdict 
was reduced by the Court accordingly. R Vol. III, p. 480. 
The Court found that both plaintiffs were the prevailing 
parties in this case. The Court found that Walton was a prevailing 
party since the verdict was, even after reduction for collateral 
sources, more than the Offers of Judgment. The Court also found 
that Bennett was a prevailing party based on his adjusted verdict 
under IRCP 68(b) of $4,336.62. R Vol. III, p. 481. This Court 
should note that this was even without considering an award of any 
attorney's fees. R Vol. III, p. 482. 
The District Court then awarded the plaintiffs' costs as a 
matter of right, and discretionary costs. The Court found, at R 
Vol. III, p. 485, that the plaintiffs had complied with Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(4), first and second paragraphs, as follows: 
Plaintiffs must have made a statement of claim in the amount 
of $25,000 or less sixty days before filing the Complaint. In 
Plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees, they have attached a 
document, which is the demand letter to Allstate Insurance Company, 
dated July 9, 2008 (Exhibit 161), which is more than sixty days 
prior to the filing of the Complaint. The letter demands $20,000 
for Plaintiff Bennett and $23,000 for Plaintiff Walton, each of 
which is less than $25,000. Defendant attached to her documents 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Claims that accompanied the demand letter. 
The Defendant has made no objection to the validity of the 
submitted demand letter or the Statement of Claims. Thus, at least 
initially, I.e. § 12-120(4) applies to this case. 
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The Court then discussed the plaintiffs' Complaint. The Court 
first said that the Complaint requested general damages of no more 
than $25,000.00, and noted that it did expressly discuss Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(4); see R Vol. III, p. 486. However, the Court held (at 
R Vol. III, p. 486) that the Complaint eventually requested over 
$25,000.00 as follows: 
The Court, having reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
finds that the Plaintiff Bennett asked for special 
damages in the amount of $4,537.71, and general damages 
in an amount of more than $10,000, but less than $25,000. 
Plaintiff Walton asked for special damages in the amount 
of $4,192.92 and general damages in excess of $10,000, 
but less than $25,000. 
The Court understands each Plaintiff to be asking 
for general damages in the amount of no more than 
$25,000. However, the Complaint does not state that 
total damages will be less than $25,000. When adding in 
the special damages, each Plaintiff's demand would 
surpass the I.e. § 12-120(4) maximum of $25,000. 
Al though the Comp1aint does not inc1ude a different 
a11eged injury or a significant new item of damage not 
set forth in the statement of c1aim, the Plaintiff's 
Complaint does not comply with§ 12-120(4) in that each 
P1aintiff asks for more than $25,000. Thus, Plaintiffs 
removed their case from the applicability of the statute 
when they filed their Complaint. (Emphasis supplied) . 
The Court then held that a different alleged injury or 
significant new item of damage was presented at trial. The Court 
I held at R Vol. III, p. 486-487 as follows: 
The third and final factor is whether the Plaintiffs 
included in evidence offered at trial, a different 
alleged injury or a significant new item of damage not 
set forth in the statement of claim. The Court has 
reviewed the evidence offered at trial and finds that the 
P1aintiffs have not a11eged a different injury from that 
in the statement of c1aim, but Plaintiffs have included 
in their evidence offered at trial a significant new item 
of damage not set forth in the statement of claim. 
(Emphasis supplied). 
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The Plaintiffs provided to the Court their demand 
letter dated July 9th, 2010, that was given to the 
Defendant's insurer. The statement of claims for 
Plaintiff Bennett was in the amount of $20,600 and for 
Plaintiff Walton $23,200. During the trial, the 
Plaintiffs presented evidence of $30,734.47 in damages 
for Plaintiff Bennett and $41,252.72 for Plaintiff 
Walton. The Court finds a significant difference in the 
amounts asked for from the time of the demand 
letter/statement of claim to the evidence offered at 
trial. The difference in damages leads the Court to 
believe that what is being asked is a significant new 
item of damage that was not set forth in the statement of 
claim. I. C. § 12-120 ( 4) was intended to encourage 
parties to settle when a claim for personal injury is 
less than $25,000. (Emphasis supplied). 
The plaintiffs submit that the Court "believes" is simply 
irrelevant in this case. 2 In this case, the Court 1 s belief is not 
supported by the record or case law (discussed below), since there 
was no different or significant new item of damage presented at 
trial, but only argument for increased pain and suffering. 
The Court then discussed Johnson v. Sanchez, supra, as cited 
by the plaintiffs. The Court then rejected this rationale and 
decision and stated that it did not apply to this case. The 
appellants claim that this is really the key issue on appeal. 
The Court, therefore, issued an amended judgment to Walton of 
$10,671.63, and Bennett of $5,065.11. R Vol. III, p. 491. This 
was after all interest and costs but before any attorney fees. 
The plaintiffs then filed a motion for relief and 
reconsideration of the post-judgment motions denying attorney 1 s 
2 
The plaintiffs may have believed that the Court simply wanted 
to help his former law firm employer and partner, but such beliefs 
really are irrelevant to this proceeding. 
APPELLANTS 1 BRIEF 14 
fees; R Vol. III, p. 493-494. The plaintiffs also filed a motion 
to amend the complaint to conform with the evidence under I.R.C.P. 
15(b) and to make it more clear that the amount they requested was 
$25,000.00 or less. R Vol. III, p. 495-496. 
The defendant filed an objection to the plaintiffs' motion. 
The defendant admitted that she did not specifically object to the 
plaintiffs' claim for costs and attorney's fees based on the 
allegations of the Complaint. R Vol. III, p. 498, fourth 
paragraph, first two sentences. The defendant claimed the 
plaintiffs asserted a significant new item of damages at trial not 
set forth in their demand letter. The defendant also stated that 
the Court should deny the motion to amend the complaint as not 
being timely filed by the plaintiff. 
The hearing on the motion for reconsideration was held on 
September 27, 2010. The plaintiffs argued that the Complaint was 
filed for less than $25,000.00 under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), but a 
motion to amend the complaint had been filed to clarify the record. 
Further, there had been no evidence of any significant new item of 
damages offered at trial, and there was, at most, only an argument 
made for a higher range of verdicts to the jury. Tr 489-492. 
The Court stated that there was an argument for additional 
damages at trial, but it was for the same old injuries and nothing 
new. Tr 502, L. 12-17. The Court stated that arguing a 
significant increased amount for the same old injuries warranted 
denial of attorney's fees. Tr 502-503 and 511 (amount claimed). 
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The Court noted that the plaintiffs have the right to appeal 
and hoped that they do, because there should be some clarification 
on this issue. Tr 502. 
The Court issued its Minute Entry & Order denying the motion 
to reconsider at R Vol. III, p. 513-514. This appeal followed at 
R Vol. III, p. 515-519. The plaintiffs paid the judgment pending 
appeal of the attorney's fees issue. R Vol. III, p. 520-521. 
There was no cross appeal filed by the defendant on any issue. 
iii. A Concise Statement of Facts and Evidence at Trial 
The plaintiffs called seven (7) witnesses at trial. This 
included the plaintiffs Bennet and Wal ton, their wives Kelly 
Bennett and Devan Walton, Physical Therapist Ronald Rutten, 
Chiropractor Henry West, and the defendant's independent medical 
examination (IME) Dr. David Simon. Their testimony consisted of 
the only evidence offered at trial in this case, and the 
plaintiffs' damage summaries were not admitted into evidence after 
an objection that they were not evidence; although there was no 
objection to their admission under§ 12-120(4). Tr 17, 117, and 
120. 
The jury was instructed that the defendant admitted liability. 
Tr 4, and 20. Therefore, the only issue in the case was the amount 
of the plaintiffs' damages for estimated future medical care, lost 
wages, pain and suffering. See also jury instructions found at R 
Vol. II, pages 228 and 235-236, and special verdict at R 192-193. 
Kelly Bennett testified that her husband missed work after the 
injury. He went to the emergency room, and then received physical 
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therapy and treatment from Dr. Henry West. Tr 32, 33-36. At that 
point, the defendant attempted to place into evidence that worker's 
compensation insurance should have covered all or part of Bennett's 
medical expenses and lost wages. The plaintiffs objected and moved 
for a mis-trial, in part based on a pre-trial ruling that no 
insurance should be placed into evidence. The Court gave a 
curative instruction that such insurance is irrelevant. Tr 43-50, 
R Vol. II, p. 210-211. 
Walton testified that he worked as a drywall finisher at the 
time of the collision. He testified as to what happened at the 
time of the collision when Nancy Patrick pulled out from behind a 
steam roller, on a main road on a through street and collided with 
his truck. Tr 51-52. 
Walton was treated at the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
room. Tr 53. He was diagnosed with a cervical sprain and strain 
and was tender at the C5-6 location of his back. Tr 56. He was 
placed in a soft cervical collar, and given a work restriction of 
not to lift over five to ten pounds. Tr 55, 59. He then rested 
from work for several days and took one week off work. Tr 61, 67. 
He testified that he had no prior back problems before the 
collision. 
Wal ton then treated by his private physician Dr. Richard 
Maynard. He had tenderness with muscle spasms, and was treated 
with medication and heat therapy. Tr 67-71. 
He received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Henry West. Dr. 
West performed several tests and prescribed an MRI (Magnetic 
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Resonance Imaging) test. Tr 74-80. The MRI showed a minor broad-
based posterior disc bulge at C4 and 5 and C5-6. Tr 81, 83. 
Dr. West then treated Walton with chiropractic manipulation, 
massage, electrical stimulation, ultrasound, and other therapy. He 
was not working during some of this time which apparently helped 
his recovery. However, he still had back pain and took Ibuprofen 
medication. Tr 81-84. 
Walton was cross-examined by the defendant's attorney. His 
tax returns showed minimal income, so the jury awarded him no lost 
income. Tr 91-96, and 124. 
He had headaches on consul tat ion with Dr. Maynard and Dr. 
Simon. Tr 109. On cross-examination Walton testified at trial, 
and in his deposition, that he had been referred by Dr. Maynard for 
treatment with Dr. West. Tr 105-106. 
The Court ruled again that the damage summaries (Exhibit 153) 
could not be admitted into evidence, because pain and suffering was 
simply argument and not evidence. Tr 120. 
Bennett then testified that at the time of the collision he 
was texting his wife since he was a passenger in the truck. Tr 
137-138. Therefore, like Nancy Patrick, he did not actually see 
what happened in the collision. 
Bennett was treated at the Portneuf Medical Center emergency 
room with pain medications and muscle relaxers. Tr 140. Bennett 
was advised to take bed rest for a few days, and not work for a 
week. Tr 143-146. However, the jury awarded only minimal lost 
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wages for about one week; which was the approximate amount of his 
paycheck at Kiggins Concrete. Tr 204. 
Bennett was then bending over picking up hand tools while 
working and had pain in his back. Tr 143-144. This pain was found 
to be related to the collision by his treating physician Dr. 
Holmstead. Tr 145-146, 158. Dr. Holmstead also found that he had 
I muscle spasms. Id. 
Bennett then had physical therapy including stretching, 
electrotherapy, heat therapy, and an injection of pain killers. 
This gave him some relief but he still continued to work in pain. 
Tr 149-156. 
Dr. Holmstead would then not treat Bennett further because he 
owed a bill. Bennett then saw chiropractor Dr. Henry West. Tr 
157, 159-160, 266-268. Bennett then testified that Dr. West's 
chiropractic treatment included chiropractic manipulation (in which 
he could feel his back pop), ultrasound, electrical stimulation, 
and massage. Tr 187-188. 
Bennett also attended an IME by Dr. David Simon. At the IME 
he hurt his back and he felt it "pop" during a test. He sought 
treatment with Dr. Holmstead, but could not pay, so he was treated 
by Dr. West two more times. Tr 189-192. 
Physical Therapist Ronald Rutten testified as to the physical 
therapy treatment administered to Bennett, including ice and heat, 
electrical stimulation, and therapeutic exercise. Tr 168-172. 
Ronald Rutten thought that progress had been made and that Bennett 
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had improved. Tr 171-173. He testified in depth as to his charges 
for the physical therapy treatment. Tr 174-176. 
Dr. Henry West is a chiropractic physician in Pocatello, Idaho 
that treated both the plaintiffs. Tr 266-229. The defendant 
stipulated that he was qualified as an expert. Tr 228. 
Dr. West testified that he treated Walton for complaints of 
neck pain caused from the collision a month earlier. He was 
diagnosed with a cervical sprain or strain and given other tests 
that were summarized on Tr pages 233-240. Walton was referred and 
prescribed an MRI by Dr. West. The MRI was taken at Idaho Medical 
Imaging, and showed a minor posterior broad-based disc bulge at CS-
6 noted as a cervical disc syndrome. Tr 245-246. Walton's 
objective complaints were consistent with the test results as to 
the nature of his reported injury. Tr 247. Dr. West found Walton 
had a 29 percent impairment as documented under the GAMA 
guidelines. Tr 253. 
Walton was treated with spinal manipulation, ultrasound, and 
electrical stimulation. Tr 254-255. His prognosis was favorable 
and no surgery was indicated. Tr 247 and 265. 
Dr. Henry West testified that he also treated Bennett. Tr 
266-268. He was found to have low back pain secondary to a lumbar 
strain from the motor vehicle collision (a torsional strain), and 
his subjective complaints were substantiated by the record. Tr 
269. He was also treated with chiropractic manipulation, 
ultrasound, and electrical stimulation. 
condition improved. Tr 270. 
Tr 270-271. Bennett's 
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Dr. West also treated Bennett for the aggravation of his prior 
injury when he was at work, and at the IME. Tr 27 0-271. His 
prognosis was good, but he would probably need more treatment and 
pain medication. Tr 274. 
There was some cross-examination on Bennett not using a 
seatbelt at the time of the collision. Tr 283. The Court gave a 
curative instruction on the seatbelt defense; R Vol. II, p. 230. 
Devan Wal ton testified that Ben Wal ton was injured in the 
collision and had muscle spasms. Tr 294-295, and 301. Therefore, 
he took non-prescription pain medication that cost about $5 to $15 
a month. Tr 296. 
Dr. David Simon is a physician in Idaho Falls, Idaho. He is 
the Medical Director of the Rehabilitation Unit of Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center (EIRMC), a large hospital, in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. Tr 324. He performed an Independent Medical Examination 
(IME) for the defendant on both plaintiffs. Tr 304-5. 
The IME on Walton was marked and admitted over the defendant's 
objection as Exhibit 13 5. His medical history showed no pre-
existing conditions prior to the collision, and his post collision 
treatment. Tr 308-309. The emergency room record marked and 
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 84 showed pain and stiffness, and 
the MRI marked and admitted into evidence as Exhibit 132 showed a 
disc bulge, both at the C5-C6 level of his back. Tr 313-314. 
There was a positive "Patrick's test" with trigger points and local 
muscle stiffness. Tr 316-318. He pointed where the trigger point 
occurred which was found near the C5-C6 level of his back. Tr 319-
1 320. 
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On cross-examination Dr. Simon did not find that Walton's disc 
bulges were that meaningful; Tr 371-372. The IME showed mild 
residual pain and myofascial pain from a whiplash type injury 
caused by the collision. There was no evidence of pain 
exaggeration or magnification. Tr 321-323. 
The defendant's IME Dr. Simon recommended that Walton receive 
additional physical therapy, muscle relaxers, trigger point 
injections, and home exercise. Tr 323-324. Dr. Simon recommended 
physical therapy for three to four weeks or six to twelve sessions. 
Tr 325-326. Dr. Simon (surprisingly) had no opinion as to the cost 
of the physical therapy, but the Judge permitted the plaintiffs to 
argue that Bennett's physical therapy bill was similar since Dr. 
Simon had noted it was not unusual or extraordinary. Tr 330. 
Dr. Simon testified that the trigger point injections would be 
about $175 each. Tr 342. The three trigger point injections would 
be necessary at a cost of $525.00 total. Tr 349. He thought that 
chiropractic and physical therapy could be substituted to some 
extent, and it is not unreasonable for Walton to have more 
chiropractic treatment. Tr 345. Dr. Simon testified that the 
over-the-counter pain medications used by Walton were reasonable. 
Tr 348. 
good. 
Dr. Simon testified that he thought Walton's prognosis was 
However, his condition would probably be the same, 
especially without intervention, for the rest of his life. Tr 355. 
Dr. Simon also performed an IME on Bennett. Tr 356. His 
medical history showed no back problems prior to the collision that 




He was diagnosed to have lumbar back strain, but recommended no 
MRI. Tr 358. He thought that Bennett's pain was minimal. Tr 358. 
The Bennett IME found tenderness over the right sacroiliac 
area of the right lower back. The "Patrick's test" is an external 
rotation of the legs, 
359-360. This was 
and was positive for Bennett as well. Tr 
the test in which Bennett felt back pain 
(popping) that caused the need for more chiropractic treatment. 
Dr. Simon thought the second work injury was an aggravation or 
exacerbation of the pre-existing back injury caused by the MVC and 
could not apportion the damages. Tr 361-363, 380. He thought that 
the motor vehicle accident predisposed him to the work related 
injury within a reasonable medical probability. Tr 381-382. Dr. 
Simon testified that there was no significant pain magnification by 
Bennett. He testified that Bennett had no history of any prior 
chronic back problems or pain prior to the collision. Tr 364-365. 
Dr. Simon thought Bennett's prognosis was good. He did not 
criticize Bennett for taking additional over-the-counter pain 
medications. Tr 366. 
The plaintiffs rested. The defendant called Nancy Patrick. 
She admitted that she did not actually see what happened at the 
time of the collision, and admitted to hitting the plaintiffs' 
truck on the passenger side. However, she said the impact was 
minimal, despite tearing off her bumper, and spinning around 
Walton's truck on the road. Tr 388. 
The Court then read the jury instructions. The parties then 
gave closing arguments. Tr 399. 
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Walton argued for an award of his past medical expenses of 
$3,030.92, future medical expenses of $4,972.80, including Dr. 
Simon's recommended treatment of about $1,524.00, future medication 
of $20.00 per month, lost wages of $1,200.00, and pain and 
suffering of $10,000.00 to $30,000.00. Tr 421-422. 
Bennett then argued for his past medical expenses of 
$1,878.47, future medical expenses or pain medication of $5,000.00, 
lost wages of $2,600.00, and pain and suffering of $7,000.00 to 
$21,000.00. Tr 424. 
The defendant argued in closing that the airbags did not 
deploy so it was not a very bad collision, the injury at work to 
Bennett was not caused by the collision, and Bennett's concrete 
work caused the injury, and there was evidence (not produced} of 
i prior back injuries. The plaintiffs objected since airbags had not 
been brought up or mentioned by any party or witness before this 
testimony. Tr 432. The Court allowed this in closing and gave no 
curative instruction at all. Id. These defense arguments were 
really the only "new claims" made at trial by either party. 
The defendant argued that both plaintiffs should be allowed 
their damages for past medical expenses which were stipulated by 
the parties. However, Bennett should only be awarded $600.00 to 
$700.00 in lost wages. Tr 438. The damages for pain and suffering 
should be awarded in the amount of only $1,000.00 for Bennett, and 
$3,000.00 to $4,000.00 for Walton. Tr 450. 
The jury requested a calculator. The Court would not give 
them one. Tr 458-459. The jury awarded the plaintiffs total 
damages as follows: Bennett $3,978.47; and Walton $10,030.92. 
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4. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
a. Whether the complaint complied with Idaho Code § 12-
120 ( 4) or alleged a claim in excess of $25,000.00? 
b. Whether the complaint prayed for an amount less than 
$25,000.00 in substantial compliance with Cox v. Mulligan, 142 
Idaho 356, 128 P.3d 893 (2005)? 
c. Whether the decision to deny the Motion to Amend the 
Complaint was an abuse of discretion? 
d. Whether there was any new significant item of damage not 
set forth in the plaintiffs/appellants' original claim? 
e. Whether the plaintiffs/appellants offered any evidence 
(as opposed to argument) of any new item of damage at trial? 
f. Whether the Court should have awarded attorney's fees 
under the case law of Johnson v. Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 99 P.3d 
620 (Ct. App. 2004), Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 909-910, 120 
P.3d 289 (Ct. App. 2005) and Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 
l 576-577, 130 P. 3d 1111 (2006)? 
5. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs and appellants Bennett and Walton claim 
attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
120 ( 4) . These attorney's fees and costs are proper in this case 
for the reasons stated in this brief. See also Idaho Appellate 
Rules 35(b) (5), 38, 40 and 41. The plaintiffs reserve the right to 
file further statements, and assert a claim for attorney's fee when 
this Court issues a decision on the merits. 
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6. ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court exercises free review over questions of law and 
statutory interpretation, like the issues in this case; Johnson v. 
Sanchez, 140 Idaho 667, 669, 99 P.3d 620 (Ct. App. 2004), discussed 
below with numerous other citations omitted. See also State v. 
Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 929, 104 P.3d 969, 971 (2005); State v. 
Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689, 85 P.3d 656, 665 (2004); Wattenbarger v. 
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. Idaho __ , 24 6 P. 3d 961 (2010); 
Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC, 139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743 (2003). 
B. IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(4) 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), provides for an award of costs and 
attorney's fees in civil cases where the amount of the damages 
requested is under $25,000.00. This section provides as follows: 
12-120. Attorney's fees in civil actions - (4) . In 
actions for personal injury, where the amount of 
plaintiff's claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five 
thousand dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and 
allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the 
action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as 
attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded 
attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action, 
written demand for payment of the claim and a statement 
of claim must have been served on the defendant's 
insurer, if known, or if there is no known insurer, then 
on the defendant, not less than sixty (60) days before 
the commencement of the action; provided that no 
attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the 
court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, 
prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at 
least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
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The term "statement of the claim" shall mean a 
written statement signed by the plaintiff's attorney, or 
if no attorney, by the plaintiff which includes: 
(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of 
damage claimed by the plaintiff including the amount 
claimed for general damages and the following items of 
special damages: ( i) medical bills incurred up to the 
date of the plaintiff's demand; (ii) a good faith 
estimate of future medical. bil.l.s; (iii) lost income 
incurred up to the date of plaintiff's demand; (iv) a 
good faith estimate of future loss of income; and (v) 
property damage for which the plaintiff has not been 
paid. 
(b) Legible copies of all medical records, bills and 
other documentation pertinent to the plaintiff's alleged 
damages. 
If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to 
commence the action, or in evidence offered at trial, a 
different al.l.eged injury or a significant new item of 
damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the 
plaintiff shall be deemed to have waived any entitlement 
to attorney's fees under this section. (Emphasis added). 
The statute only requires that "medical bills incurred up to 
the date of plaintiff's demand" and a "good faith estimate of 
future medical bills" be included in the demand. The key issues in 
this case are whether the complaint filed to commence the action, 
or in evidence offered at trial, raised a different alleged injury 
or significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of 
claim which would require that the plaintiffs be deemed to have 
waived any entitlement to attorney's fees. 
In this case, there was a demand made 60 days prior to the 
filing of the action on the defendant's insurer, and a statement of 
a claim containing an itemized statement of each item of damage, 
including past medical expenses, future estimated medical expenses, 
lost income, and property damages. A legible copy of all medical 
bills and other documents were included with the original demand. 
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There is no dispute or objection raised on these matters so the 
Court ruled the demand was proper at R Vol. III, p. 485. 
In this case the defendant did not tender, prior to 
commencement of the action, at least 90% of the amount awarded to 
the plaintiffs. A computation of the amounts tendered before the 
filing of the litigation are as follows: 
Plaintiff Defendant's 90% of jury verdict 
offer 
Walton: $5,000.00 $9,027.83 
Bennett: $2,500.00 $3,508.62. 
Therefore, under this section, the plaintiffs and not the 
defendant, are entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees. 
See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009). 
1. Plaintiff Ben Walton. 
In this case Wal ton was awarded over $10,000. 00 at trial. 
This was over twice as much as Allstate's final offer of $5,000.00 
before the case was filed under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). This was 
about one-third more than the final Allstate mediation offer and 
offer of judgment of $6,484.00. Therefore, he is clearly the 
prevailing party under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d) (1), and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68. 
The Court should note that the damages awarded by the jury 
included Walton's total past medical expenses, his future medical 
expenses which the defendant's IME Dr. Simon testified were 
reasonably medically necessary, but did not include any 
compensation for lost wages, and only a small portion of Walton's 
pain and suffering. These claims are virtually identical, and not 
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substantially new or different from what Walton claimed prior to 
the filing of this litigation and in his demand letter under Idaho 
Code§ 12-120(4). 
Walton would argue that the failure to award him more damages 
for his pain and suffering was likely motivated by the conduct of 
the defendant's counsel as stated in the motion to alter or amend 
the judgment. The jury did not award the amount suggested to them 
by counsel plaintiff's in closing argument~ so there was no harm or 
prejudice to the defendant from the argument in this case. 
However, this supports awarding the plaintiff Walton his costs and 
attorney's fees to increase damages for pain and suffering to a 
more reasonable amount. 
2. Plaintiff Mat Bennett 
In this case Bennett was awarded about $4,000.00 by the jury. 
This was almost twice as much as what Allstate offered to Bennett 
prior to litigation being filed under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4), so 
Bennett is entitled to his costs and attorney's fees under that 
section. The jury award was also more than the first Allstate 
offer of judgment made on April 29, 2010 in this case. Bennett 
notes that under the law he was the prevailing party up to that 
point. 
However, Allstate made a second offer of judgment on May 18, 
2010 to "Plaintiff Mathew Bennett in the amount of Four Thousand 
Thirty-Two Dollars ($4,032.00). In this offer the plaintiff would 
be required to pay any and all remaining subrogation demands or 
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claims of liens, and any attorney's fees allowed by contract or law 
as well as costs incurred to date." See R Vol. II, p. 267. This 
offer of judgment expressly included "all attorney's fees allowable 
by contract or by law as well as costs incurred to date" which is 
the same language included in the adjusted award under IRCP 68(b). 
The adjusted award for Bennett was computed by the Court to be 
a total of $5,065.11. R Vol. III, p. 491. This included pre-
judgment interest and costs, but no attorney's fees at all, which 
would have substantially increased his award. 
Bennett notes that if Allstate would have made an offer prior 
to the case being filed of over $4,000.00 and/or an offer of 
judgment of $4,000.00, plus accrued costs and attorney's fees to be 
set by the Court, which was declined by Bennett, then they may be 
entitled to their costs. Allstate should have doubled their offer 
I before the case was filed, and increased their offer to include 
costs and attorney's fees after the case was filed, in their offers 
of judgment. Instead they spent almost the amount in controversy 
in Court costs to try to defeat the plaintiffs' valid claim. The 
failure to do so makes liability for Bennett's costs and attorney's 
fees clear under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4) and IRCP 68(b). 
The Court should compare the offer and recovery for each party 
independently. Gilbert v. City of Caldwell, 112 Idaho 386, 399, 
732 P.2d 355 (Ct. App. 1987). 
However, even if the Court combines the offers, the plaintiffs 
as a group are still the prevailing parties. See Collins v. Jones, 
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13l Idaho 556, 559-560, 961 P.2d 647 ( 998); instructive on Rule 
68 (b). In this later case the strict Court granted an additur 
then held that based on the additur alone, without costs and fees, 
the plaintiff was entitled to costs attorney's fees. 
C. THE COMPLAINT COMPLIED WITH IDAHO CODE§ 12-120(4) 
The decision on post-t al motions raised for the first time 
a claim that over $25,000.00 was sought in the complaint. In fact, 
the plaintiffs note that the Verified Complaint was filed for an 
amount under $25,000.00 and sought attorney's sunder Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(4), as stated specifically in Prayer at paragraphs A 
and B, last sentence, and paragraph Con attorney's es and costs. 
The Prayer of the complaint is s above, and attached hereto. 
The issue or objection that over $25,000.00 had been prayed 
for in the complaint was not raised by Patrick or her 
insurer at any time. See Defendant's Answer at R Vol. I pages 18-
19, Defendant's Objection to Plainti Post-T 
Additur, Interest, Costs and Attorney's Fees fil 
R Vol. II, p. 362; and the entire case le, s 
not ever made by the defendant. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides 
assert all affirmative defenses in their answer. 
Motions for 
July 7, 2010 at 
this claim was 
a party must 
The lure to 
raise this defense may be considered a waiver of that claim or 
See McKee Brothers Ltd. v. Mesa Equipment, Inc., 02 
Idaho 202, 202-203, 628 P.2d 1036 (1981). 
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Moreover, the failure to make an objection or raise the claim 
that the complaint failed to comply with§ 12-120(4), in response 
to the plaintiffs' motion for costs and attorney's fees, should be 
construed as a waiver of that claim as well. See Conner v. Dake, 
103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173 (1982), failure to object as a waiver 
of right to contest an award of attorney's fees. 
The defendant understood that there would be a claim under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(4), since the complaint is plain and 
unambiguous. The defendant waived any claim or defense to the 
contrary by her failure to object and raise this defense in their 
I answer or subsequent pleadings. 
Second, the Court should recall that the statute at Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(4), only states that, "If the plaintiff includes in the 
complaint filed to commence the action, or in evidence offered at 
trial, a different alleged injury or a significant new item of 
damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall 
be deemed to have waived any entitlement to attorney's fees under 
this section." (Emphasis added). The statute, on its face, does 
not preclude filing a complaint with a prayer in excess of 
$25,000.00, just a different alleged injury or a significant new 
item of damages. There was no significant new item of damage since 
the IME of the plaintiffs by Dr. Simon had not taken place, and the 
prayer is the same as the demand letter. 
Further, the statute requires a good faith estimate of future 
medical bills. There is no way a plaintiff can know the exact 
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amount of their future medical treatment and bills if their 
treatment is not complete and they have not fully recovered. 
It is important to note that the complaint did not include or 
allege a different injury or a significant new item of damages not 
set forth in the statement of claim. The amount prayed for in the 
complaint does not even have to be stated, as it was in this case, 
to be less than $25,000.00. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected a substantially similar claim 
that the amount of damages prayed for barred an attorney's fees 
claim under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4) in Cox v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho 
356, 128 P.3d 893 (2005). This court held that a plaintiff was not 
even required to plead for damages under $25,000.00, where the 
plaintiff made a written demand that complied with Idaho Code§ 12-
1 120(4), and the amount awarded by the jury is less than $25,000.00. 
The Court noted that a complaint, like the in this case, that 
requested damages of $25,000.00 or less, would comply with the 
statute. The Court reasoned, at 142 Idaho 358, as follows: 
The Defendants argue that the pleading requirement 
of subsection ( 1) is essential to put defendants on 
notice that the plaintiff is seeking attorney's fees. We 
disagree. Under subsection (1), the complaint would 
include an allegation that the damages sought do not 
exceed $25,000.00. Under subsection (4), the statement 
of claim would include an itemized list of damages that 
did not exceed $25,000.00. The allegation in the 
complaint required by subsection (1) would not provide 
any greater notice than the allegations in the statement 
of claim served under subsection (4). 
Finally, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) to conform to the evidence, 
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since the amount awarded by the jury was under $25,000.00. R Vol. 
III, p. 495-496. This motion was denied by the District Court, but 
should have been granted to cure any alleged ambiguity in the 
complaint as to the amount claimed. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) states as follows: 
Ru1e 15(b). Amendments to conform to the evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendment of the p1eadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, 
the court may allow the p1eadings to be amended and sha11 
do so free1y when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party 
fai1s to satisfy the court that the admission of such 
evidence wou1d prejudice the party in maintaining the 
party's action or defense upon the merits. The court may 
grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. ( Emphasis supplied) . 
Therefore, this Court has ruled that unless surprise or unfair 
l prejudice is shown, the amount of a claim may be amended to conform 
to the proof, even during or after a trial on the merits. See 
Resource Engineering Inc. v. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., 110 Idaho 136, 
137, 714 P.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Thus, where no facts had been presented to show any specific 
unfair advantage and the defendant was informed in the plaintiffs' 
first pleading, and had been on notice throughout the litigation, 
that the plaintiff sought to claim foreclosure of a lien for 
whatever amount the court might determine, the district court 
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abused its discretion by refusing to allow a revision of the amount 
claimed for the pleaded time period. Resource Engineering Inc. V. 
Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., supra, 110 Idaho at 138. 
In conclusion, the complaint was correctly pled with no new or 
different claims to obtain an award of attorney's fees and costs 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). re was no defense raised in the 
answer or an objection in any later p that it did not do so. 
The Court should reaffirm the dee ion in Cox v. Mulligan, that the 
prayer is sufficient if it puts the fendant on notice of the 
potential claim for fees, but can filed for more than 
$25,000.00. Finally, to the extent re is any ambiguity, this 
Court should grant the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. 
D. No Evidence of Any Different or New Item of Damage at Trial. 
The Court then finds that there was no different alleged 
injury from that stated in the claim, but 
the plaintiffs "included in their 
significant new item of damage not set 
Court "be eved" that 
red at trial a 
in their original 
statement of the claim." See Decision on Post-Judgment Motions R 
Vol. III, p. 486-487; Tr 502, L. 12-17 and 502-503. 
strongly disagree factually (as stated above) and 
out below) for the following reasons. 
p intiffs 
ly (as set 
The ad case interpreting this statute is the case of Johnson 
v. Sanchez, supra, 140 Idaho at 667. In this case the a iff 
made a statement of the claim as required by Idaho Code § 12-
120 {4), waited for 60 days, then sued for damages under $25,000.00. 
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However, "During the trial, Johnson presented testimony and 
argument to the jury reflecting her damages in an amount greater 
than the amount demanded in her statement of claim." 140 Idaho 
668. Further, "Johnson's statement of the claim submitted damages 
in the amount of $3,500.00 for future medical bills. However, at 
trial Johnson presented video-tape deposition testimony of a doctor 
Johnson's future medical bills could cost as little as 
$15,000.00 but could reach as high as $100,000.00." Id at 669. 
The jury awarded $21,126.00 in damages, and the court awarded 
attorney's fees which was affirmed on appeal. This decision is "on 
all fours" and clearly supports an award of attorney's fees to the 
plaintiffs in this case. 
The Johnson v. Sanchez Court began the analysis with the 
standard of free review in statutory interpretation under the plain 
meaning rule, at 140 Idaho 669, as follows: 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which 
we exercise free review. Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355, 
17 P.3d 296, 299 (Ct. App. 2000). When interpreting a statute, 
we will construe the statute as a whole to give effect to the 
legislative intent. George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 
118 Idaho 537, 539-40, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990); Zener, 
135 Idaho at' 355, 17 P. 3d at 299. The plain meaning of a 
statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd 
results. Watkins Family, 118 Idaho at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388; 
Zener, 135 Idaho at 355, 17 P.3d at 299. (Emphasis supplied). 
The Trial Court Judge, who was affirmed on appeal, held that 
there was no waiver of attorney's fees in this case as follows: 
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Sanchez raised the issue of whether significant new 
items of damage were offered at trial in his motion to 
disallow attorney fees. In addressing the motion, the 
district court stated: 
Having reviewed the evidence, as well as the 
statement of claim, it is this Court's determination that 
[Johnson] did not offer evidence at trial of a different 
injury or of a significant new item of damage. However, 
there is no doubt that [Johnson] did submit evidence at 
trial which would have permitted the jury to award an 
amount of damages in excess of the amount set forth in 
the statement of claim. Even if one were to classify 
such evidence as constituting a "new item of damage," the 
amount in question was such that it did not constitute a 
"significant" new i tern of damage. Based on the 
foregoing, it is the determination of this Court that 
[Johnson] did not waive [99 P.3d 623] attorney fees and 
is, pursuant to the provisions of I.e.§ 12-120(4), 
entitled to the same. 
The Appeals Court went on to hold there was no significant new 
item of damages claimed, at 140 Idaho 670, ss follows 
No Idaho case law exists construing the phrase 
"significant new i tern of damage not set forth in the 
statement of claim." However, I.C. § 12-120 (4) (a) 
outlines the requirements for a statement of claim, which 
includes a statement for general damages and certain 
"items" of special damages such as medical bills and 
future lost wages. Johnson complied with the 
requirements in I.C. § 12-120 (4) (a). At trial, Johnson 
did not present evidence of items not listed in the 
statement of claim, such as property damage. Johnson 
only offered evidence with respect to those items already 
listed in the statement of claim. Nevertheless, Johnson 
provided evidence of an increased amount of damages. 
Thus, we must determine whether the offering evidence of 
different amounts of damages in this case constituted a 
significant new item of damage. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(4) presumes that the 
amount of damages may change from the time the statement 
of claim is drafted to the date of trial. For instance, 
the statute requires that the plaintiff include a "good 
faith estimate" of future medical bills and of future 
loss of income. It does not require that the plaintiff 
list the precise amount that will later be presented at 
trial. In personal injury cases such as this one, it may 
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be years after the statement of claim is submitted before 
the case reaches trial and the parties present evidence 
of damages. Even if a plaintiff submits a statement of 
claim with his or her good faith estimate of damages, at 
the time of trial the plaintiff may have incurred more 
damages that were not earlier foreseen and may have a 
more accurate estimate of the amount of future damages 
because of intervening developments. Therefore, although 
Johnson presented evidence of an increased amount of 
damages at trial, this does not in itself constitute a 
waiver of attorney fees. Having reached this conclusion 
on the plain meaning of "significant new items of damage 
not set forth in the statement of claim," we cannot 
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in 
its findings. Where a trial court's findings are not 
clearly erroneous and where the trial court properly 
identifies and applies the law to the facts, then the 
trial court's exercise of discretion has not been abused. 
Crawford v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 112 Idaho 820, 
822, 736 P.2d 872, 874 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The Idaho Supreme Court went even further and rejected a 
similar defense claim in the case of Contreras v. Rubley, supra, 
142 Idaho at 573, 576-577. The Court held that even a new property 
damage claim of $2,500.00 "was not significant enough to constitute 
a waiver of Contreras' right to attorney's fees" under§ 12-120(4). 
The Court found this sum was insignificant when compared to the 
total claim that was made and was not a factor in the decision made 
by the defendant's insurer to deny the claim. 
The Court in Contreras v. Rubley noted there was no prejudice 
to the defendants from the undisputedly new claim, since the 
defendants had failed to settle the case and the jury verdict was 
ultimately under $25,00.00. The Court ruled, at 142 Idaho 577: 
Even though evidence of the property damage was new, 
it is not significant enough to constitute a waiver of 
Contreras' right to attorney fees. Contreras' original 
Statement of Claim to Rubley's insurer on June 18, 2002, 
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sought $20,000 in damages. The insurer disclaimed 
liability for the accident and made no tender to 
respondents in an attempt to settle the case. *** As 
Rubley's insurer disclaimed any liability by concluding 
Siebanthaler was 100% responsible for the accident, it is 
difficult to see how a lack of awareness of damage to the 
car played any part in Rubley' s insurer's refusal to 
settle prior to the commencement of the suit. We affirm 
the district court's award of attorney fees to Contreras 
made pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(4). 
Similarly, the Court in Harris v. Alessi, supra, 141 Idaho at 
901, 909-910 held that even though one medical bill had not been 
presented, that a small difference in the claim did not constitute 
a waiver of costs and attorney's fees. The Court ruled that 
because the insurance company already knew about all the bills at 
the time the case was filed and during settlement negotiations, 
there was substantial compliance with the statute. 
7. CONCLUSION 
First, it is the items of damage and amount stated in the 
written demand, and not the amount stated in the complaint, that is 
the touchstone; Cox v. Mulligan (supra). The claims in this case 
(for past and future estimated medical expenses, lost wages, pain 
and suffering) were totally identical in the demand letter and 
complaint, which expressly complied with Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 
The defendant's Answer failed to object or raise any 
affirmative defense to the award of attorney's fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-120 ( 4) , which were all waived under the case law. 
Rather, the parties stipulated and the Court ordered in the 
defendant Patrick's bankruptcy that there would be no award in 
l excess of $25,000.00 to each plaintiff under the Allstate policy; 
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which was the law of the case after that date, really making any 
opposition to an award of attorney's fees based on the complaint or 
arguments at trial under Idaho Code § 12-120 ( 4) in this case 
legally irrelevant and moot. 
The defendant then also failed to object to an award of 
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(4) based on the 
complaint, in all her later post-trial pleadings, motions and 
oppositions to the plaintiffs' motions. There was a double and 
even triple waiver of these defenses under the case law. 
Second, the plaintiffs' injuries and claims have always been 
I the same and they never made any claim to any DIFFERENT or NEW 
injury or i tern of damage. The plaintiffs made claims for back 
injuries that included damages for past and estimated future 
medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. 
This is shown from the summary of damages attached to the 
demand letter and the closing argument made to the jury. There is 
no new claim made at all, and the claims are in fact virtually 
identical: past medical bills, future medical bills, lost wages, 
pain and suffering. The plaintiffs did not offer any evidence of 
any kind of any new injury or item of damages at trial. There is 
no place in the record where the plaintiffs presented any evidence 
of any kind of new injury, like, for example, a foot or arm injury, 
property damage claim, lost consortium, etc. 
The plaintiffs' only adjusted and slightly increased their 
prior estimated item of damages for future medical bills based 
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solely on the evidence at trial of the defendant's IME Dr. Simon as 
to their need for future medical care and events that transpired at 
the IME. The plaintiffs then presented a closing argument that the 
jury could consider increasing the items of prior damage for future 
medical care, pain and suffering. 
As to Walton, it is true that the defendant/respondent's IME 
doctor prescribed additional future medical care to him, but this 
was for his same old back injury (not a new injury) to his spine at 
CS-6. This only slightly increased his estimated future medical 
care claim by about $1,500.00, which is far less than $2,500.00 
discussed in Contreras v. Rubley, supra; and increased the argument 
made to the jury to consider a higher range for future pain and 
suffering. 
As to Bennett, the IME "Patrick's test" was positive, which 
caused an aggravation of his prior symptoms for which he sought 
treatment from his chiropractor and used over-the-counter pain 
medication that caused some relief. This only increased his 
estimated future medical care claim by about $168. 00, which is 
again far less than $2,500.00 discussed in Contreras v. Rubley, 
supra; and increased the argument made to the jury to consider a 
higher range for future pain and suffering. 
The Court should rule that the testimony and evidence of the 
defendant/respondent's IME Dr. Simon, including opinions on future 
necessary medical care, may be introduced by the plaintiffs without 
waiving attorney's fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120, and the cases of 
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Johnson v. Sanchez, Contreras v. Rubley, and Harr is v. Alessi 
(supra). Otherwise, the defendant may obtain an IME without fear 
of an adverse opinion which will never see the light of day, the 
truth will be suppressed and not known to the jury, plaintiffs will 
go under-compensated and justice denied to injured Idahoans. The 
plaintiffs' counsel had an ethical obligation to pursue the case 
zealously and within the bounds of the law. There was a legitimate 
dispute as to how much the damages for pain and suffering for the 
same old injuries the jury should award and the IME was clearly 
relevant on that issue. The defendant can claim no prejudice from 
her own IME being put into evidence. 
Further, the Court should affirm the old horn book rule that 
arguments are not evidence under IDJI 1.00 and 1.05. In this case 
the jury was instructed twice that closing arguments are not 
evidence, at R Vol. II, p. 212 and 213, as follows: 
Just as the opening statements are not evidence, 
neither are the closing arguments. During the closing 
arguments, the attorneys will summarize the evidence to 
help you understand how it relates to the law. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the 
evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence consists 
of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted 
into evidence, and any undisputed or admitted facts. 
While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help 
you understand the evidence and apply the instructions, 
what they say is not evidence. If any attorney's 
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you 
should disregard it. 
Moreover, an argument for increased damages is not prohibited 
by Idaho Code§ 12 120(4) either expressly or by implication. The 
argument that the Court could award an amount in a range of 
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$7,000.00 to $41,000.00 for pain and suffering for these same old 
injuries that were already in evidence is not improper. In fact, 
this is consistent with the case law including, especially the 
cases of Contreras v. Rubley and Johnson v. Sanchez. 
In the experience of the plaintiffs' counsel, juries rarely 
award the amount claimed by the plaintiff in closing arguments, and 
frequently reduce these claims by 50% (one-half). In cases like 
this, where the defendant is a sympathetic older woman and the jury 
is not informed there is any insurance, the jury's award for 
damages would be expected to be reduced by the jury, and was 
significantly reduced in this case. 
There has never been a case that holds that a "significant 
difference" in amounts asked for in oral argument (for the same old 
injuries) amounts to a "significant new item of damage" which would 
warrant denial of attorney's fees. This holding is totally 
contrary to the express language of the statute, and all the case 
law interpreting it. The Court should re-affirm the rule that 
"argument" is not "evidence", and plaintiffs' counsel may argue 
from the same old existing evidence, the jury may award damages in 
excess of $25,000 without waiving the right to claim attorney's fee 
under the other cases cited above since there is no different 
alleged injury or a significant new item of damage in evidence. 
Moreover, even if this were a decision that was left to the 
discretion of the District Court, the denial of attorney's fees 
under the circumstances of this case would be a clear abuse of 
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discretion. The jury clearly intended that the plaintiffs receive 
the entire amount of their verdict, without a reduction for any 
kind of Court costs or attorney's fees. If the Court fails to 
grant attorney's fees, the plaintiffs will not have the benefit of 
their bargain and their contract agreed in the stipulation that the 
defendant pay their past medical bills. 
The policy behind the statute is clearly to encourage 
defendants to make reasonable settlement offers before the case is 
even filed. The court's decision does not encourage the defendants 
to settle, but instead rewards them for making inadequate initial 
offers, contesting liability through summary judgment, continuing 
to make inadequate offers of judgment, and forcing cases to trial; 
then making totally improper arguments based on worker's 
compensation insurance, the seat belt defense and the similar air 
bag defense, and otherwise. The Court's decision did not make the 
plaintiffs' whole since they had to pay their attorney's fees and 
costs. If an erroneous and hyper-technical reading of the statute 
applies, then no attorney will take on these smaller personal 
injury cases because of the risks involved, and victims will go 
uncompensated or under-compensated. 
There can only be a forced waiver of attorney's fees if: there 
is evidence offered at trial of a significant new item of damage 
not set forth in the statement of the claim. In this case, the 
claim was for the same injuries and same damages, al though the 
amount of claim for pain and suffering was higher, which is not 
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only expected to occur, but is expressly allowed by the Court in 
Johnson vs. Sanchez and the other cases, supra. 
The intent of the statute seems to be to prevent a plaintiff 
from making a written demand under§ 12-120(4) that intentionally 
omits a specific item of damages, and then claiming attorney's fees 
on top of a large award in excess of $25,000.00. This type of 
"sandbagging" is not present here since there is no claim for any 
specific new item of damages and the total damages awarded were 
less than $25,000.00, to both plaintiffs. 
In any case, the total amount awarded was less than $25,000.00 
for all these same claims (past and future medical expenses, lost 
wages, and pain and suffering). The amounts awarded at trial for 
each item of damage were the same or less than the demand letter to 
Allstate. The plaintiffs' argument for an additional award of 
damages (for the same old alleged injuries) was rejected by the 
I jury to a large extent. An excessive verdict may be modified by 
remittur, which was done here and granted here by the Court. There 
was no harm or prejudice to the defendant from the plaintiffs' 
claim at trial, and the intent of the legislature is that they 
should get their fees. 
Finally, there was a Bankruptcy Court stipulation and order 
that there would be no award in excess of $25,000.00 to each 
plaintiff under the Allstate policy. This was the law of the case 
after that date really making the rest of the defendant's claims of 
any opposition to an award of attorney's fees based on the 
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arguments at trial under Idaho Code § 12-120 ( 4) in this case 
irrelevant and moot. 
WHEREFORE, the appellants/plaintiffs Bennett and Walton 
request that this Court reverse the decision of the District Court 
so that the legitimate and valid claims for costs and attorney's 
fees be awarded to the appellants/plaintiffs. 
DATED this 30 th day of March, 2011. 
Charles Johnson 
JOHNSON OLSON CH 
Attorney for Appellants/Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies and e-mailed a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document, by placing the same in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Brendon C. Taylor 
Jared Steadman 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 





L. C!!ARLES JOHNSON, III 
TELEPHONE: (208) 232-7926 




JOHNSON OLSON r CHARTERED 
P. 0. BOX 1 7.25 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1725 
July 9, 2008 
Allstate Company 
Idaho-E. Washington 
P.O. Box 6828 
Boise, Idaho 83707-0828 
-------EXHIBIT 
1 61 
USE P.O. BOX FOR MAI 
PHYSICAL STREET ADDRES 
419 WEST BENTO, 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-172, 
Re: 
INSURED: 
Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton v. Nancy Patrick 
NANCY PATRICK 
DATE OF LOSS~ 
CLAIM NO: 
October 18, 2007 
0105166771 
Dear Ms. Geren and Ms. Saito: 
·This acknowledges my prior letter to you dated May 8, 2008 
(copy enclosed) regarding ·the case of Mathew R. Bennett· and· 
Benjamin L. Walton v. Nancy Patrick. This letter is written to 
update and supplement that letter with the following information. 
You have admitted your c.liene,is totally at fault and we propose to 
settle the case in 11 with Allstate and not pursue claims 
the road construction companies who probably have no fault. 
First, Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton have basically 
completed· their treatment and substantially recovered from 
injuries they suffe~ed from·the motor vehicle collision in this 
case. They continue to have some minor residual pain and suffering 
but.have now completed their chiropractic treatment with Dr. Henry 
West. 
Second., I am enclosing an Exhibit List including all the 
medical records for Mathew Bennett and Benjamin Walton in this 
case. There are no other medical records on of these 
individuals that we know of at this time. 
Third, I am enclosing a list of the medical providers, medical 
bills, and damages summaries for these individuals. This includes 
the 11 amount of 'their wage loss to date. · 
Benjamin Walton was seen at the emergency room immediately 
a the motor vehicle collision. He had severe neck pain and 
complained of being nauseated. Benjamin Walton was diagnosed with 
Cervical Spine Strain and Lumbar Spine Strain. He was instructed 
to wear a soft collar for a week, do no lifting, and then follow up 
with his physician if his condition did not improve. The x-rays at 
the hospital showed a mild straightening the lumbar spine 
associated with muscle spasm. 
Ben Walton was then seen by Dr. Richard Maynard for pain and 
stiffness in his lower back. He missed work about one week, 
causing losses of $1,000.00 to $1,200.00. He was treated 
conservatively with pain relievers ,,1"8d then chi rnnr;:i ,-,·H,., ~ -- - .._ __ 
.,=......,,,......,,.,.., T"\-...... rt ..... ---- ...... 
Allstate July 9, 2008 Page 2 
The medical records of Dr. Henry West were positive for 
several tests with limited range of motion and pain in his cervical 
spine, f oraminal compression tests, shoulder depressant tests, 
Bickele's test, the Sitting root tests and bilateral leg raise. 
The cervical spine x-rays show a significant injury at C-7. 
The cervical spine MRI shows minor posterior broad-based disc 
bulqes at C4-5 and C5-6 and cervical disc syndrome from the motor 
vehicle collision. Dr. Henry West diagnosed Benjamin Walton with 
acute traumatic side lash cervical sprain/strain, brachial 
radiculopathy, and mid-level inter-sigmental dysfunction 
characterized by akinesis and acute lumbar strain and limitations 
in the range of motion in the cervical and lumbar spine. 
However, Benjamin Walton's injuries significantly improved 
from the chiropractic treatment administered by Dr. Henry West. He 
advises that at this point he still has only minimal residual pain 
and stiffness in his neck and some headaches that he.treats with 
over-the-counter medication. 
Mathew Bennett was seen at the emergency room immediately 
after the motor vehicle collision. He complained of moderate neck 
and back pain with stiffness and chest pain. He was diagnosed with 
acute and chronic musculoskeletal low back pain from the motor 
vehicle collision. He was given medications, including Flexoral, 
and Vicodin. Dr. Evan Holmstead saw Mathew Bennett on October 30, 
2007 for his complaints of low back pain from the motor vehicle 
collision. He has liini ted range of motion with a fin ding of 
objective paraspinous muscle spasm. He was given a release from 
work from Evan Holmstead, M.D., (marked as Exhibit 53). He then 
received physical therapy at Portneuf Physical Therapy for about 
three weeks. He attempted to work but his back pain flared up 
during this process., He improved slowly and had some progress from 
this treatment, but still had returning flare ups in his pain. 
On November 20, 2007 Mathew Bennett was again seen at the 
emergency room for low back pain. He was apparently unable to work 
for about another week after this flare up in his symptoms. The 
doctor again found lumbar muscle spasm with low back pain and 
continued him on physical therapy and light duty work, and 
continued his prescription of Flexoral and-other pain relievers. 
He has worked in pain for the last several months. 
Mathew Bennett then sought further chiropractic treatment from 
Dr. Henry West for his injuries. His tests were positive for 
several objective problems. He then received chiropractic 
treatment, including DMT spinal, electro-stimulation, and 
ultrasound. He has substantially recovered after his treatment 
from physical therapy and treatment from Dr. West, but he still 
uses over-the-counter pain medications. 
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In my opinion, a reasonable Bannock County jury would find no 
negligence on the part of Benjamin Walton and find Nancy Patrick 
totally at fault. However, if this claim is not resolved with your 
organization then Mathew Bennett and Benj.amin Walton reserve the 
right to join any other parties that are or may be responsible in 
this case. 
Finally, I have summarized Mathew Bennett and Benjamin 
Walton's medical bills, pain and suffering and lost wages on the 
enclosed damages summaries. A reasonable Bannock County jury would 
probably award reasonable compensation and damages to· Mathew 
Bennett in the amount of at least $20,000.00, and Benjamin Walton 
in the amount of at least $23,000.00. 
Therefore, these claimants would be willing to settle this 
case for a payment to them in these amounts, if accepted within the 
next sixty (60) days. If this offer is not accepted then Mathew 
Bennett and Benjamin Walton reserve the rig~t to file a lawsuit for 
recovery of their damages, lost _wages, costs, expenses and 
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(4). 






MATTHEW R. BENNETT 
DAMAGES SUMMARY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/08 $291.00 
Portn(=uf Medical Center 11/20/08 $631. 84 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $316.00 
11/26/08 through 11/27/07 
Portneuf Medical Center Physical Therapy $116.00 
12/06/07-
Mountain View Family Medicine (Dr. Evan Holmstead) $191·. 60 
10/30/07 and 11/29/07 
West Chiropractic (Dr. Henry West) $310.00 
Shopko Pharmacy Prescriptions $81.27 
10/18/07 through 04/21/08 
TOTAL MEDICAL $1,937.71 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for $2,500.00 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus future 
medical care as necessary 
LOST WAGES 
Lost Wages of $26.00} an hour, ·for the dat~ accident for $2,600.00 
two and a half weeks at eight hours a day 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 
Pain and Suffering (estimated three times bills) $13,500.00 
TOTAL $2Q, 60.0. 00 
BENJAMIN L. WALTON 
DAMAGES SOMMA.RY 
MEDICAL BILLS 
Portneuf Medical Center 10/18/07 $917:00 
Primary Care Specialists (Dr. Richard Maynard) $2-02. 42 
10/26/07 ·and 11/09/07 
West Chiropractic $703.00 
11/21/07 through 05/07/08 
-
Idaho Medical Imagin~ 02/19/08 (MRI) $1,170.50 
TOTAL MEDICAL $2 ,'992. 92 
Future Medical Bills; estimated to be $20.00 a month for $2,500.00 
pain medication for rest of life expectancy plus future 
medical care as necessary 
LOST· WAGES 
Lost Wages for one week from the date accident $1,200.00 
PAIN AND SUFFERING 
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The plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. Walton, 
individually and through their counsel of record, hereby fi this 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES IN AUTOMOBILE 
COLLISION AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL against the defendant, Nancy 
Patrick, and complains, pleads, and leges as follows. 
A. PARTIES 
1. The plaintiff, Mathew R. Bennett, at all times material 
hereto, was a resident of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho. 
2. The plaintiff, Benjamin L. Walton, at all times material 
hereto, was a resident of Pocatel1o, Bannock County, Idaho. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 1 
I 
( 
Henry West were positive for several tests with limited range of 
motion and pain in his cervical spine, foraminal compression tests, 
shoulder depressant tests, Bickele's test, the Sitting root tests 
and bilateral leg raise. The cervical spine x-rays show a 
significant injury at C-7. 
24. Therefore, Dr. Henry West then referred' the plaintiff 
Walton to have an MRI at Idaho Medical Imaging. The cervical ·spine 
MRI shows minor posterior broad-based disc bulges at C4-5 and CS-6 
from the motor vehicle collision. Dr. Henry West diagnosed 
Benjamin Wal ton with acute traumatic side lash cervical 
sprain/strain, brachial radiculopathy, and mid-level inter-
sigmental dysfunction characterized by akinesis and acute lumbar 
strain and limitations in the. range of motion in the cervical and 
lumbar spine. 
25. However, the plaintiff Walton's injuries significantly 
improved from the chiropractic treatment admini'stered by Dr. Henry 
West. He advises that at this point he still has only minimal 
residual pain and stiffness in his neck and some headaches that he 
treats with over-the-counter medication. 
2 6. The plaintiff Walton also has lost wages from this 
collision in the amount of about $1,200.00. 
E. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, Mathew R. Bennett and Benjamin L. 
Walton, pray for judgments agaitist defendant, Nancy Patrick, as 
vehicle owner, responsible party and negligent driver as follows: 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 7 
A. Special damages for plaintiff Mat Bennett's past medical 
bills of $1,937.71, future medical bills for over the counter pain 
medication, and lost wages of $2,600.00; and general damages for 
pain and suffering in an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such 
other amounts as may be proven to a jury at trial, but less than 
$25,000.00 at this time; 
B. Special damages for plaintiff Ben Walton's medical bills 
of $2,992.92, future medical bills for over the counter pain 
medication, lost wages of $1,200.00, and general damages for pain 
and suffering in an amount in excess of $10,000.00, or such other 
amounts as may be proven to a jury at trial, but less than 
$25,000.00 at this time; 
C. For attorney's fees and costs in-b-ringing this action, in 
the amount of $2,000.00 if by default and future attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(4); and 
D. For stich other and further r~lief as this Court deems 
just and equitable under the premises for plaintiff. 
'lvf'(J_ 
DATED this~ day of October 2008. 
Charles Johnson 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all claims in the complaint. 
Charles Johnson 
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